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1 DISAPPEARING ACROSS THE BORDER
Hidden among the hills on the shores of a large lake in Uganda’s 
Isingiro district lies Nakivale. Long before it became an official refugee 
settlement in 1960, the kings of Ankole who reigned in the area used 
to retreat to Nakivale in times of inter-kingdom conflict. The locality 
of Isanja, close by the lake, was considered a sacred place where the 
kings were also brought upon their deaths to eventually disappear 
under the watchful gaze of the king’s guards, guided by the spirits of 
the lake. This practice had long been abandoned when Isanja became 
the first site in Nakivale where Rwandan refugees settled in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. However, still respected by the few locals who 
inhabited the area, Isanja was a place people avoided going for fear 
they would disappear and never come back. An old chief living on 
the hills remembered that Ugandans were suspicious of the refugees’ 
magical powers and identities at that time because they had somehow 
withstood the spirits of the lake and had managed not to disappear.
THE CAMP AS A PLACE TO HIDE
Refugee camps are one of the most visible landmarks of forced 
displacement today. Unlike refugees living in villages, towns, or cities, 
those staying in camps cannot engage in practices to conceal their 
refugee status or to disappear into the host population. Everyone 
knows that you are a refugee when you live in Nakivale. Yet, in many 
ways, refugee camps are also places in which a variety of dynamics, 
activities, and identities are purposely hidden and rendered invisible. 
While the chief was, of course, right in stating that the Rwandan 
refugees had not physically disappeared, people fleeing violent conflict 
and persecution are ,in reality, hiding across the border, outside of 
the reach of their governments and armed groups, and under the 
legal protection of an international humanitarian umbrella. In this 
sense, it can be argued that refugees and the internally displaced 
do disappear on certain levels and from certain actors. A refugee’s 
identity is anonymous on principle and should only be known by 
the UNHCR, humanitarian agencies and the department of refugee 
affairs of the host country (UNHCR 2018). To help maintain this 
anonymity and protection, access to the camp is, again, in principle, 
only possible through a rigorous asylum procedure, and visitors are 
required to make their identities and intentions known to camp 
authorities before and on arrival. Of course, time and again many 
events have recurrently highlighted the numerous cracks in this 
official system of protection, revealing, for example, easy penetration 
by combatants and intelligence agencies from abroad.
 Yet, methods of (protective) anonymity and invisibility are 
not only developed from the top down, but are also part of a bottom-
up process, through which a variety of actors practice different ways 
to hide a variety of activities, mobilities, personal histories, identities, 
trajectories, and experiences from a variety of other actors both 
within and outside the camp or host country. However, while some 
refugees have cut communication entirely with their compatriots 
in the country of origin, others remain in touch in  several ways. 
Social interactions and information sharing with friends and 
relatives through social media, phone calls, money exchange, and 
circular mobility between the camp and countries of origin take 
place regularly and constitute a way of maintaining relationships 
and support networks. While their identities are thus known to their 
contacts ‘at home,’ refugees often attempt to conceal their presence 
in the camp by being vague or fabricating stories to these personal 
contacts, thereby creating their own protective measures. However, 
while communication from a distance (e.g., through social media) 
allows a certain degree of vagueness on one’s doings and whereabouts, 
this becomes much more difficult when both parties physically meet 
each other, for example through circular return movements. 
 By examining circular return movements between Nakivale 
and eastern DRC, this research brief will explore the practices and 
social dynamics of secrecy and concealment among Congolese 
refugees who hide their relationship with the camp from their 
friends and relatives “back home.” While refugees of many different 
nationalities sporadically or regularly return to their countries 
of origin for short or long periods while maintaining a residence 
in Uganda,4 for personal and ethical reasons,5 this paper focuses 
specifically on Congolese respondents. Congolese constitute the 
majority of the approximately 100,000 inhabitants of Nakivale 
at the time of this field research. They arrived in large groups in 
the mid-1990s, the second half of the 2000s, and in 2012-2013. 
Smaller numbers have continued to trickle in throughout the years. 
During two two-week research trips in 2018, I accompanied two 
friends whom I will call Bamidele and Faruq on short family visits 
to their home towns of Goma and Bukavu.6 In addition, a number 
of Nakivale residents connected me with friends and family in 
and around Goma and Bukavu, who, in turn, provided me with a 
broader perspective on the camp from the outside, and allowed me 
to  explore issues of return and circular movement further. The field 
trips to Goma and Bukavu were made in the context of a four-year 
doctoral research project on the role and position of refugee camps in 
conflict mobilities in Central-East Africa.7 The focus of the Ph.D. lies 
on Nakivale Refugee Settlement in which most of the ethnographic 
fieldwork takes place. As such, this research brief presents an early 
analysis of the camp as a place to hide in relation to the dynamics of 
circular return between Nakivale and eastern DRC. 
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 A total of 55 inhabitants of Goma, Bukavu, and Nakivale 
directly participated in this specific research, in addition to 
interactions with other Nakivale inhabitants within the framework 
of the broader Ph.D. The analysis greatly benefited from a reflection 
meeting with four researchers from GEC-SH at the Institut 
Supérieur Pédagogique at the end of my stay in Bukavu (Irène 
Bahati, Vianney Cukas Muderhwa, Stanislas Bisimwa Baganda and 
Christian Chiza Kashurha) and conversations with two researchers 
in Goma (Chrispin Mvano and Olivier Ndoole).
 In the following sections, I analyze the dynamics of secrecy 
surrounding cross-border mobility by starting with a section on 
secrecy and circular return followed by explaining how people’s 
secrecy over their presence in Nakivale gradually infringed on my 
position as a researcher and companion, necessitating my complicity 
in concealing their doings and whereabouts and eventually also, 
partly, my own identity. I then proceed to focus on two themes that 
often determined conversations in Nakivale and DRC about circular 
return and the presence of Congolese in refugee camps: (1) discourses 
on danger and insecurity in DRC (titled as ‘the battleground’), and 
(2) resettlement aspirations.
ON CIRCULAR RETURN AND SECRECY
Refugee return – whether permanent, for long periods or short visits 
– is rarely an easy process. From the end of the nineties onwards, 
academic researchers have generally agreed that return is a very 
problematic concept and a difficult process, casting returnees into 
new socio-economic and political realities (Tegenbos & Vlassenroot 
2018: 10). Further, scholars working on circular mobilities have 
found that the concept and practice of return is also a very fluid and 
ambiguous one. Many refugees attempt to minimize risk by moving 
between host and ‘home’ countries, simultaneously benefiting from 
refugee protection and socio-economic connections with their 
countries of origin (Hovil 2010, Kaiser 2010, Harpviken 2014). 
These practices render migration an inherent part of the return 
process. Circular movements among Congolese refugees living in 
Nakivale take place regularly. The border is near, and passports and 
other travel documents can be bought or negotiated easily. These 
movements may involve visiting friends and relatives, trading goods, 
checking up on farms and cattle herds, and combatants engaging 
in armed incursions. They can be part of a long-term repatriation 
process, as one person, for example, explained his decision to 
undertake several trips a year to Goma while gradually trying to create 
a base for permanent return through reestablishing social networks 
and searching for property.8 In other cases, circular movements 
help to support a protracted stay in exile, establish opportunities 
for business, maintain social relations, or briefly relieve the stress of 
financial, social, and emotional challenges people face in the camp. 
In the case of my two companions, Bamidele and Faruq, this stress of 
‘camp life’ served as the main reason for their family visits to Goma 
and Bukavu. However, their return was not an easy process for either 
of them. 
 Nakivale has a profound relationship with the dynamics of 
secrecy, concealment, and mystery. The social interaction between 
Congolese in Nakivale and eastern DRC, whether from a distance 
or during return visits, is only one area in which this relationship 
is  established. These dynamics became powerfully clear during 
and after the two research trips in which my participation in hiding 
people’s presence in the camp became crucial. From the start of 
my field research in Nakivale in 2017, I had been invited by several 
Congolese to accompany them on their circular return journeys to 
DRC. Given the possible legal implications of a refugee crossing the 
border with her/his country of origin, I conditioned my participation 
in an invitation to a journey that was to take place anyway. The details 
of the two return trips were thoroughly prepared and discussed with 
Bamidele and Faruq in advance. Further, upon hearing of my travel 
plans, many Nakivale inhabitants requested me to visit their friends 
and family who lived in and around Goma and Bukavu. However, 
the purpose of the research trips was discussed ,and consent was 
obtained before departure. 
 Yet, neither myself nor the people who put me in touch 
with their acquaintances in DRC seemed to have realized in advance 
how these visits, in the context of a research project, risked exposing 
their presence in the camp. Upon arrival in DRC, I was unexpectedly 
drawn into a web of mystery and secrecy as Nakivale inhabitants 
pleaded with me, last-minute, to hide their relationship with the 
camp when meeting their friends and relatives. I consequently 
started to take an active part in concealing what would gradually 
come to seem like a rather public secret, at least  relative to the camp 
as a whole. Building on Simmel’s sociology of secrecy and secret 
societies (1906, 1950), Taussig theorized the “public secret” as “that 
which is generally known, but cannot be articulated. (…)The secret 
of the public secret is that there is none” (Taussig 1999: 5 & 7). In 
the context of the return trips, the public secret existed  as a general 
awareness on the part of the inhabitants of Goma and Bukavu 
that many of their fellow denizens quietly left the cities to live in 
refugee camps abroad. On the personal level of all but one Nakivale 
inhabitant, their presence in the camp was not openly communicated 
to everyone they knew in DRC and kept deliberately hidden from 
public view. Fabricated stories about their doings and whereabouts 
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in Uganda replaced actual reality, although almost everyone had one 
or two confidants who were officially aware of their real situation and 
with whom I was often linked to in DRC. In turn, the Congolese I 
interacted with in Goma and Bukavu knew that those staying in the 
camps generally invented stories about studying or doing business in 
Kampala (Uganda’s capital). Nakivale inhabitants thus attempted 
to maintain their personal secret in DRC amid a general public 
awareness that many Congolese in Uganda are in one way or another 
connected to the camps and lie about it.
WITH FARUQ IN BUKAVU: 
PROVIDING AND TAKING COVER
My journeys with Bamidele to Goma and with Faruq to Bukavu in 
2018 unfolded quite differently. I accompanied Bamidele to Goma 
where he visited his family regularly while maintaining a residence in 
Nakivale. He had fled Bunia at the age of 15 when he and his family 
were briefly living there in 2005. In the chaos of an attack by ‘rebels’ 
in the area, Bamidele and his little sister found themselves separated 
from the others and eventually ended up in Uganda. Unfortunately, 
my stay in Goma largely elapsed without Bamidele. The unfolding 
of different developments in Nakivale required Bamidele’s sudden 
attention, which compelled him to return on the very day of our 
arrival. Although I remained in touch with his close family during my 
stay, I was thus unable to follow the personal process of Bamidele’s 
return. 
 For Faruq, on the other hand, going back to Bukavu to 
attend his parents’ 50th wedding anniversary was his first return since 
arriving in Nakivale a year earlier. In the camp, Faruq often proudly 
stated that he was not a refugee, but a businessman. “For me, I am not 
a refugee. I did not come from across the border with my jerrican and 
mattress on my head, fleeing violence and war. I am a businessman.”9 
Faruq had come to Uganda to find a way towards bulaya (Congolese 
Swahili for ‘Europe,’ but also often a broader term for ‘the West’) via 
resettlement, a procedure that is much easier accessed in the camps 
than in urban environments. He had studied informatics at one of 
the better universities in South Kivu, but he had become frustrated 
with the political instability and economic insecurity in Bukavu 
after four years of unemployment. In Bukavu, Faruq and I regularly 
spent time together with and without his friends and family. It was 
thus especially my trip with Faruq that revealed the many complex 
intricacies and difficulties that were involved in maintaining the 
secret of his relationship with the camp. 
 Importantly, both Faruq and Bamidele had not 
communicated their real whereabouts to everyone they knew in 
DRC. Faruq had been forced to inform his parents of his true 
intentions in Uganda a few months earlier when he ran out of money 
to pay rent in Kampala (Faruq generally divided his time between 
Kampala and Nakivale depending on his financial reserves10). For 
Bamidele, only his parents and brother were aware that he lived in 
the camp. Apart from Bamidele and Faruq, all but one Nakivale 
inhabitant asked me to hide their real doings and whereabouts 
in Uganda from public view in DRC. Their reasons varied from 
security concerns to family problems and worries that their contacts 
in DRC would not understand why they were in Nakivale. These 
often also revealed deep feelings of shame about living in a refugee 
camp. Many of these reasons connect to the reasons why they had 
originally left DRC, while others were more linked to their current 
situation or reasons for which they had remained in the camp, rather 
than returning home. 
 My time in Goma and Bukavu might be best described as a 
complex interplay of taking and providing cover. On the eve of many 
first meetings in Goma, I received urgent and unexpected phone 
calls from Congolese in Nakivale warning me not to disclose their 
real whereabouts and advising me instead to tell their friends and 
relatives that I had met them in Kampala where they were supposedly 
working, studying, or doing business. Importantly, their secret 
relationship with Nakivale forced me to conceal different aspects 
of my visits to Goma and Bukavu as well. My status as a researcher, 
the purpose of my visit, my business, and interest in Uganda (and 
Nakivale), the nature of my relationship with their friends and 
relatives, and the circumstances in which I had met them all suddenly 
became sensitive conversation topics. In addition, most Nakivale 
inhabitants had not told their contacts in DRC much about me. 
Some of them were aware that I was a researcher (in Nakivale), but 
others were not – and deliberately so. Often, and especially in the 
beginning, I had to invent and fabricate stories on the spot, trying to 
remain true to my identity as a researcher without jeopardizing the 
covers of my friends in Nakivale. I was better prepared for Bukavu, 
having had extensive conversations with Nakivale refugees in advance 
to finetune my narratives. With most direct contacts in Bukavu, I was 
allowed to be open about their conditions in the camp and about my 
own position as a researcher. However, suspicion about my motives 
and identity often remained and were admittedly mutual, certainly 
on the first meeting. I was ‘a friend at home’ but also simultaneously 
an unknown researcher, and I would often first test the water to 
learn how much they knew about me and their contact in Nakivale 
– something which the other party would often do as well. Evidently, 
this sometimes created an atmosphere of mystery and distrust, which 
was not always resolved in the end. 
4 DISAPPEARING ACROSS THE BORDER
 During my time with Faruq in Bukavu, the challenges in 
upholding the fabricated reality he had been trying to maintain for 
more than a year of absence were manifold. In general, Uganda was 
seen as a country with a low cost of living and many opportunities 
for study and business. A few of Faruq’s friends had gone to and 
come back from Uganda with profitable returns, and the pressure 
for Faruq to perform the same trajectory was high. Thus, while 
Faruq had been living on his parents’ financial reserves after having 
outlived his own, returning with empty pockets was not an option 
for the, albeit unsuccessful, ‘businessman’ he claimed he was. When 
his parents later on gently refused to support any more expenditures, 
Faruq  risked not only losing his cover, but also his reputation. 
Faruq had a lot of friends, and wherever we came, his desire to 
party combined with the social pressure to buy everyone a ‘happy 
return’ drink and show off his acquired wealth gradually infringed 
on my own pockets. After his parents decided to cut their support, 
I agreed on a daily allowance during our two weeks so he could 
make small errands and buy a few beers in the evenings. Admittedly, 
the issue of money was recurrent in our daily conversations – and 
arguments – and posed some dilemmas. Faruq’s parents disapproved 
of his choice to return to Uganda after the celebration of their 50th 
wedding anniversary. Providing further financial support during 
our stay enabled Faruq to largely support his fabricated stories of 
being a businessman in Kampala in front of his friends in Bukavu – 
which no doubt his parents found problematic as well. However, the 
possibility existed that if and when Faruq lost his protective cover, 
my own would be fractured as well. The money secretly provided to 
Faruq also allowed me to partly conceal my intentions since people 
did not so easily question Faruq’s activities in Uganda or imagine 
that they related to my research on refugee issues.11 Usual suspicions 
related to the ‘public secret’ of Congolese staying in refugee camps 
and/or seeking resettlement in Uganda did not apply here. Faruq 
was successfully enacting his fabricated story by spending the money 
he had supposedly earned in Uganda. Further, given coincidental 
linkages between Faruq, his friends, and local contacts of another 
Nakivale inhabitant, I could not risk the personal stories of both 
Congolese refugees being shared among each other’s social networks. 
Even with one another, Nakivale inhabitants maintain a great deal 
of secrecy over the reasons that took them to Uganda. In the end, 
of course, researchers are as much guided by personal as by ethical 
or practical choices in the field. Maybe this relates to what Simmel 
(1950: 347-348) wrote about secret societies’ “protective character as 
an external quality” and “the internal quality of reciprocal confidence 
among its members – the very specific trust that they are capable of 
keeping silent.” While we were by no means a “secret society”, Faruq 
and I were trusted companions, bound to each other by the secret we 
shared and had agreed to protect. 
 Yet, “secrecy is always somewhat like gambling” as Herzfeld 
put it (2009: 136; see also Malaby 2003). On our first day in Bukavu, 
Faruq confided in me that his best friend Umukoro probably knew 
the truth about his stay in Uganda but would not reveal it openly. 
Whether Umukoro (or others, for that matter) suspected Faruq 
to be an officially registered refugee processing for resettlement, I 
never found out. If this had been the case, the “public secret” would 
have related as much to Faruq’s personal secret as to the general, 
public, awareness among Congolese citizens that many compatriots 
in Uganda are in one way or another connected to the camps. Yet 
evidently, either one of us making inquiries of the other would 
have contained the risk of exposing Faruq, thus openly revealing 
his secret to the other. Risk and secrecy are closely related here: 
“Secrecy engenders risk insofar as concealment entails the possibility 
of unwelcome revelation” (Jones 2014: 54). The inherent protective 
character (see also Herzfeld 2009: 136) of maintaining secrecy over 
people’s doings and whereabouts in Uganda moreover added to the 
fear of revelation, engendering a constant feeling of risking one’s 
reputation and security.
THE ‘BATTLEGROUND’
For almost all my respondents in Nakivale, shame surrounding 
“refugee life” played a role in the decision not to disclose their real 
location, and to feign a reality that was much more “acceptable” 
in DRC. Opinions and attitudes in Goma and Bukavu about 
Congolese presence in refugee settings indeed ranged from sympathy 
and understanding to stark incomprehension. Even Nakivale 
inhabitants who feared being persecuted across the border by the 
actors that had made them leave did not always engender sympathy 
or understanding among Congolese in Goma and Bukavu. Differing 
views on, and experiences with, the political instability and economic 
insecurity in DRC were significant here.
 The general image presented of Goma by refugees in Nakivale 
was that of a theatrical (literally, “like in a movie”) battleground where 
helicopters and flying bullets were part of the everyday. Many said 
they had left the city or its surroundings at the time when the CNDP 
(2006-2009) and later the M23 (2012-2013) were at their strongest.12 
The imageries of Bukavu were less daunting but still filled with 
metaphors and representations of profound danger and insecurity. 
While insecurity and incidences of violence are certainly still very 
much present as part of daily life in and around Goma and Bukavu, 
urban denizens who have remained in these cities often tended to 
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nuance this image of the “battleground,” certainly in combination 
with views on Congolese refugees living abroad. The comment that 
the latter group had not “resisted” enough was more than sporadically 
made. If they had taken flight for security reasons, what are all the 
other inhabitants of Goma then still doing there? And why had those 
who fled not come back after M23 was defeated? In Bukavu, one of 
my contacts sighed that he failed to understand why his brother lives 
in Nakivale: “He told me that he fled the war. Enitan, he doesn’t like 
war, I don’t understand why. We are used to it here.”13 As a journalist, 
Enitan had been advised by a colleague to leave Uvira and later also 
Bukavu when the threats he had been receiving from high officials 
related to his writings on sensitive political issues escalated.14 Yet, the 
comment of his older brother in Bukavu reflected a feeling towards 
Congolese refugees that many others seemed to share.
 On a two-day trip to one of the areas around the city, I 
visited a local leader and former inhabitant of Nakivale. I had been 
introduced to him by a relative of his who still lived in the camp. A 
few years ago, he had gone back to DRC to inherit the authority of 
his father, who had passed away. “Let’s be honest,” he said. “Is the 
image you get in Nakivale about Congo the same as you experience 
here?” The local leader was referring to the horrible and traumatic 
(life) stories people would often recite in my presence, in addition to 
the violent imageries (pictures, videos, stories) of massacres, attacks, 
and insecurities in eastern DRC that were circulating on social media 
and continuously watched and sent around in WhatsApp groups 
established by Nakivale inhabitants. “Of course not!” he exclaimed. 
“It’s completely exaggerated. When refugees see a muzungu, you 
need to say that Congo is unsafe so that you might help them with 
your case.” A Congolese researcher who had accompanied me on the 
trip agreed from his own fieldwork experience in Nakivale that camp 
narratives on DRC’s violent “battleground” were overly emphasized, 
although he also admitted to often downplay the gravity of insecurity 
in the country. Later that evening, the three of us (the local leader, 
the Congolese researcher, and myself) sat down in a bar for a drink 
when a loud and armed argument between two FDLR militants in 
the street suddenly pushed dozens of people inside. As clients ducked 
behind walls and under tables, the local leader quickly ordered 
the door closed and locked to keep any armed actors outside. The 
insecurity around the bar forced us to return immediately through 
the backdoor and take a hidden path that led us to the house of our 
host. It is certainly true that in Nakivale, “performance narratives” 
of victimhood, vulnerability, war trauma, and insecurities in DRC 
are widespread and moreover constitute a way of navigating the 
humanitarian system in the camp, certainly in the presence of white 
visitors (see also Ingunn 2017). However, experiences of violence and 
effects of political instability had in fact also led many Congolese to 
leave their country, which the local leader also acknowledged. 
 A few relatives who were more sympathetic to the choices of 
their family members in Nakivale argued that there was a general need 
for more compassion regarding their compatriots abroad. Others felt 
that Congolese refugees had lacked the “courage” to “resist” and live 
with the reality of political and economic insecurity. Some interpreted 
the failure of return as a sign that they were too ashamed to come 
back, after having exchanged a respectful urban life for deplorable 
conditions in makeshift refugee camps, which was thought of as a 
significant loss of prestige and social status. The risk of ‘coming 
back home with nothing,’ without diplomas, money, or verifiable 
work experience, was indeed a serious worry for many Congolese 
in Nakivale. They knew their acquaintances in Congo to be getting 
married, promoted, and expanding their businesses, while they were 
“only waiting for life to begin” as someone put it.15 The longer they 
stayed in Nakivale, the more they felt the need to fabricate realities for 
their acquaintances in DRC, and the harder it became to return. The 
tendency to cultivate memories of violence and insecurity in eastern 
DRC, moreover, added to many people’s traumas and convictions 
that Congo was not yet a safe place to return.
RESETTLEMENT
Apart from being represented as a cheap country containing 
opportunities for schooling and business, Uganda was also broadly 
perceived as a “facilitator” for refugee resettlement. From 2014 
to 2018, the Congolese departure statistics of resettlement in 
Uganda are increasing, respectively: 917, 2705, 5815, 1821, 3751.16 
Resettlement for Congolese in Uganda is mostly handled in Nakivale 
(in comparison with other camps),17 and consequently, one of 
the reasons why this camp was most frequented by those seeking 
bulaya (also in comparison with other camps in the broader region). 
Comments by Goma and Bukavu inhabitants on how Congolese 
camp refugees had lacked a certain spirit of “resistance,” were often 
linked with and reinforced by additional references to the increasing 
number of Congolese leaving DRC to seek resettlement in refugee 
camps. Those entering resettlement processes abroad were frequently 
viewed as preferring “the easy life” of Europe, Canada, or America, 
instead of trying to struggle their way out of economic insecurity 
and “resisting” or finding a way to live with political instability by 
remaining in DRC. 
 Trying your luck in a resettlement procedure was also a venture 
ridiculed by many in DRC. Most people knew that these were long 
procedures that often required you to stay in the camp for  several 
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years. Resettlement is  true, on principle, the result of a long and 
rigorous procedure. Applicants can be found eligible if they suffer 
from serious insecurity both in the host and home country, includes 
those with a severe illness, family members abroad, and whose stay in 
Nakivale has become so protracted they cannot be expected to return 
anymore (UNHCR 2011). However, apart from having a genuine 
concern, many Congolese were aware that a good narrative and at 
times, some “pocket facilitation” could expedite the process. An 
artist in Bukavu called this mentality “L’esclavage” (slavery): the all-
consuming idea that Congo was lost and that economic prosperity 
and political stability could only be found in “the west.” “For most 
of these people, they cannot be convinced otherwise anymore. Many 
young people, but others too.”18 Faruq later assured me that, although 
some people in Bukavu might find such aspirations ridiculous, “from 
the moment their relatives arrive in bulaya, you will see their pictures 
being raised on the wall.”19
 Yet, a general depreciation of resettlement aspirations was 
one of the reasons why some Congolese had left the country quietly 
without any communication. It was in this manner that a young 
woman in Nakivale showed herself relieved that I had not been able 
to find her uncle in Bukavu: “They don’t understand why we are 
here.”20 After a protracted 5-year stay in Nakivale, she and her parents 
were still waiting for an interview with the UNHCR protection 
officer. “We make up stories, that’s what we do. We thought we would 
be here for six months, that’s what we had heard. Unfortunately, we 
are still here.”21 Apart from distorting reality, “the art of silence” is a 
powerful technique in strategies of secrecy and concealment (Simmel 
1950: 349). While some fabricate “acceptable” stories to share with 
their acquaintances in DRC publicly, the young woman explained 
that she had cut communication entirely as a strategy to hide her 
doings and whereabouts in Uganda. The silences between Nakivale 
and eastern DRC are indeed profound, and even when “stayees” were 
aware of their friends’ and relatives’ presence in Nakivale, they had 
very little information on how people lived there or what happened 
in these camps.
 Further, borrowing from Walter Benjamin’s argument on 
truth, Taussig similarly argues that “the secret is not destroyed through 
exposure, but subject to a revelation that does justice to it.” (1999: 
8). In other words, revealing a secret does not destroy it, but instead 
reinforces and magnifies its power. On one of my first days in the city, 
I met in a restaurant with the brother of someone living in Nakivale. 
During our conversation, he admitted that urban inhabitants, in 
general, did not think much of Congolese residing in refugee camps 
abroad. “People here look down on them. It’s like they didn’t resist. 
That they are weak. And [refugees] are ashamed. Many do not say that 
they are [in the camps], they leave quietly. It’s like lowering yourself as 
a respectable urban citizen to a life of suffering in a refugee camp.”22 
As we were discussing the urban sentiments towards Congolese 
camp refugees, the aforementioned local leader from an area outside 
the city entered the restaurant and was immediately recognized by 
my interlocutor. Coincidentally, the leader happened to be one of my 
contacts as well, being a distant relative of someone in Nakivale.23 We 
sat down for a talk during which the local leader revealed without any 
shame that he too was a former resident of Nakivale. As we engaged, 
my other interlocutor turned silent and barely uttered a word for the 
rest of the conversation. He later confided to me that he was stunned 
by  how a man of such a reputation, being highly respected in the 
city, had been so open and frank about his former refugee status. Not 
many returnees would have done the same, he argued. The awkward 
reaction of my interlocutor to the revelation of the local leader’s 
former refugee status made powerfully clear that, amidst a public 
awareness that Congolese in Uganda are possibly connected to the 
camps, this would usually not be openly articulated in the presence 
of a (suspected) returnee. Certainly, the local leader’s revelation did 
not destroy this “public secret”. Instead, by revealing that someone 
as powerful and well-regarded as himself has also passed through a 
refugee camp, the leader complicated collectively-held assumptions 
about Congolese refugees in Uganda, thereby adding a new layer of 
mystery and confusion around this taboo topic. In a sense, then, his 
revelation magnified the secret’s power.
 Interestingly, while the local leader had been honest about his 
camp history to my interlocutor, he had not openly shared the reasons 
that had brought him there. Together with five other families, the 
local leader had sold property and belongings to pay a resettlement 
broker from the city for a direct ticket to Canada, without ever 
needing to pass the camps.24 After the broker had betrayed the 
families upon their arrival in Entebbe (Uganda), shame and loss of 
financial resources had brought them to Nakivale to live off rations 
and free agricultural land.25
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This research brief has presented a condensed and early analysis 
of dynamics of secrecy and concealment in relation to the circular 
movements of Congolese refugees between Nakivale and eastern 
DRC. This is, of course, only one area in which bottom-up processes 
of (protective) silence, anonymity and secrecy in Nakivale were 
found to be practiced and enacted. The interplay between the 
importance of being visible on certain levels and to certain actors, 
while simultaneously generating different forms of invisibility is 
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particularly relevant in refugee contexts. Refugee policies and top-
down strategies often involve the high visibility of large groups 
of people as well as policies of individual anonymity. This high 
visibility can help or interrupt refugees’ daily, individual strategies 
of anonymity that enable them to maneuver within the system and 
appropriate it for their own uses and protection. 
 In this paper, the realities that Nakivale’s inhabitants 
presented to the “outside world” allow a better understanding of the 
role and position of refugee camps in regional conflict mobilities. 
While scholars now generally agree that return is not an ‘easy fix’ that 
proclaims the end of displacement, insecurity, and political instability, 
the dynamics of secrecy and concealment during displacement that 
are discussed in this paper add another layer of complexity to our 
understanding of the return process. Fear of losing reputation and 
social status ‘back home,’ and of being persecuted abroad resulted in 
ruptures of communication and the fabrication of stories thought 
to be more “acceptable” for those who had stayed in DRC. Actual 
return, therefore, encompassed the risk of losing the protective 
cover refugees had created for themselves in an environment and 
political/humanitarian regime that is profoundly characterized by 
top-down processes of protective anonymity and isolation. While 
research on the isolation and seclusion of refugee camps is, rightly, 
increasingly being balanced by scholars who emphasize the many 
socio-economic and political connections and linkages with their 
broader environments (e.g., Jansen 2011, Betts et al. 2014), social 
dynamics between camp inhabitants and their compatriots abroad 
are rarely part of such analyses. Yet, they constitute an important 
reality not to be neglected. Indeed, the practices and strategies of 
secrecy and concealment here discussed often provoked a conception 
of the refugee camp as a secret, hidden universe. In the case of Faruq, 
his time in Bukavu was not only fraught with stress and financial 
difficulties, but also severely deepened the disconnection with his 
home town and the people he knew. Near the end of our stay, he 
proclaimed that this would be his last time ever going back. “When I 
return to Uganda, I will now become a real refugee.”26
ENDNOTES
1  At the current time of field research, the year in which Nakivale 
was officially established as a refugee settlement is not yet entirely 
clear. Numerous oral sources and official documents from the 1990s 
make mention of 1960, while a smaller number refer to 1962. Large 
groups of Rwandan refugees arrived in the area as early as 1959. 
Much of the camp’s archives were destroyed during the 1978-79 
Kagera War in which Tanzania and Ugandan rebels invaded the 
country to oust president Idi Amin from power; other documents 
disappeared during the repatriation of Rwandan refugees in the 
early nineties.
2  Conversation with a Ugandan, Nakivale, May 2018.
3  See for example the continuous developments around the probe 
into the network of former Ugandan Inspector General of Police, 
Kale Kayihura (The Daily Monitor, 17 June 2018); and the recent 
arrest of 40 Rwandans in Kampala accused of espionage and deport-
ing of Rwandan nationals to Rwanda (SoftPower, 25 July 2019).
4  Apart from Congolese, Nakivale comprises a variety of national-
ities among which are Rwandans, Burundians, Somalis, Eritreans, 
Ethiopians and a number of Kenyans, Sudanese and South Suda-
nese.
5  My relationships with Congolese inhabitants were much more 
personal than with other nationalities at the time of field research, 
which, given the importance of trust in each other on both sides of 
the companionship, was important. Further, as a muzungu, I was 
advised against crossing the border with Rwandans and Burundians 
as their return contained a much greater security risk. My ‘white’ 
presence would increase our potential visibility to government and 
armed actors upon return.
6 A note on secrecy: the paper was proofread by a Congolese par-
ticipant of this research, and whose review of the text was followed 
by discussions on, and requests for, increased anonymity. Con-
cerns about anonymity were also raised during a presentation at a 
workshop in Gulu (Uganda, July 2019), as well as by the academic 
reviewers of this paper. The intricacies of secrecy discussed in this 
paper thus also necessitated a layer of mystery to the text itself. All 
names mentioned in the paper are fictitious and of Nigerian origin 
in order not to mistake people for another Congolese individual 
with the same name. Apart from names, details of certain stories 
have been altered (places, gender, personal histories, identities), left 
out (exact dates in footnotes) or are vaguely formulated where this 
does not pose a problem for the academic integrity of the paper, 
or the narrative as a whole. It should therefore be mentioned that 
only a few women participated in this research, most research 
participants were men. Further, one of the camp refugees whose 
relatives I met in DRC does not live in Nakivale, but in Kakuma 
Refugee Camp in Kenya. We met a couple of years ago in Kakuma 
during research for my master’s thesis and stayed in touch. Upon 
hearing of my travel plans, this person put me in touch with family 
in DRC. References to conversations with both parties have been 
anonymized for family reasons to such an extent that they appear to 
concern a Nakivale inhabitant. Apart from this one person, every-
one else is registered in Nakivale Refugee Settlement in Uganda. In 
regard to the introduction and conclusion sections, no details have 
been altered, apart from people’s names.
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7  The trips to Goma and Bukavu were made with additional 
funding from a VLIR-UOS ‘Global Minds’ fund.
8  Conversation with Congolese in Nakivale, June 2018.
9  Conversation with Faruq in Nakivale, May 2018.
10  The right to freedom of movement for refugees in Uganda 
officially exists since the national 2006 Refugee Act.
11  While there is not much room to discuss the situation in 
Nakivale here, Faruq of course relied on two different narratives 
to perform credibility as a businessman in Bukavu, and a war 
refugee in Nakivale.
12  The Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) 
and its successor Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23) were two Con-
golese tutsi-led rebel movements in the Kivu region. See e.g. Jason 
Stearns (2012), From CNDP to M23: the evolution of an armed 
movement in eastern Congo.
13  Conversation with relative, Bukavu, 2018.
14  Conversation with friend, Bukavu, 2018.
15  Conversation with Congolese in Nakivale, June 2018.
16  UNHCR Resettlement Data Finder, https://rsq.unhcr.org/
en/#3ZEq.
17  Widely known among government, humanitarian and refu-
gee actors in the camp.
18  Conversation with an artist in Bukavu, 2018.
19  Conversation with Faruq in Bukavu, 2018. It must be added 
here that most of the friends and relatives I met were not the less 
affluent inhabitants of Goma and Bukavu. A researcher from 
Bukavu explained that seeking resettlement abroad is considered 
a more acceptable option for poor people (personal communica-
tion with Dr. Aymar Nyenyezi Bisoka in Kampala, 28/06/2019).
20  Conversation with Congolese in Nakivale, December 2018.
21  Conversation with Congolese in Nakivale, December 2018.
22  Conversation with relative in DRC, 2018.
23  It was not a coincidence that he walked in the restaurant. A 
researcher and mutual friend knew that the local leader was in 
town and had told him where to find me.
24  Stories and accusations of resettlement fraud are widespread 
in Uganda, as in other host countries in the region.
25  Refugees are accorded a plot of land upon their arrival in the 
camp to encourage “self-reliance”.
26  Conversation with Faruq in Bukavu, 2018.
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